Signal-jamming in the Frequency Domain

Bart Taub

Working Papers from Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow

Abstract: I examine strategic behaviour for a duopoly in a noisy environment. Firms attempt to learn the value of the rival’s privately observed demand shocks via a noisy signal of price, and at the same time firms attempt to obfuscate that signal by producing excess output on the publicly observable signals, that is, they signal jam. In a dynamic setting firms also distort the intertemporal structure of output keyed to the publicly observable demand shock process in order to disguise their private shocks. The net outcome is to radically increase the persistence of output over its full-information value.

Keywords: Dynamic games; signal jamming; strategic information; frequency-domain methods. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C62 C63 C73 D43 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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