Autocrats in crisis mode: Strategic favoritism during economic shocks

Jose Morales-Arilla ()
Additional contact information
Jose Morales-Arilla: School of Government and Public Transformation, Tecnológico de Monterrey

No 15, Working Paper Series of the School of Government and Public Transformation from School of Government and Public Transformation, Tecnológico de Monterrey

Abstract: This paper introduces a theory of autocratic redistribution and repression during economic downturns. It predicts that negative shocks induce autocrats to favor supporters in order to limit the scope of protests to opposition groups. I provide evidence on economic outcomes and policy responses to shocks from three different settings. Firstly, I focus on the Venezuelan blackouts of 2019. Nicolás Maduro’s autocratic regime protected supporter regions affected by power losses through selective rationing, containing economic consequences, protests and repression to affected opposition areas. In contrast, Hugo Chávez’s still democratic government responded to the 1999 Vargas floods with reconstruction efforts that did not engage in political discrimination, leading to balanced economic consequences across the state. Finally, I show that national droughts in Sub-Saharan Africa magnify eco-nomic differences favoring leaders’ home regions, but only under autocracies rule. These findings show how regime type can shapen the response to economic shocks.

Keywords: Autocracy; Economic shocks; Favoritism; Protest; Repression. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 H4 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 61 pages
Date: 2025-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://egobiernoytp.tec.mx/sites/default/files/20 ... _economic_shocks.pdf First version, 2025 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gnt:wpaper:15

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series of the School of Government and Public Transformation from School of Government and Public Transformation, Tecnológico de Monterrey Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Fabian Fuentes-Rivas ().