Severance Payments and Firm-Specific Human Capital

Peter Rühmann (pruehma@uni-goettingen.de) and Jens Südekum (jens.suedekum@uni-konstanz.de)
Additional contact information
Peter Rühmann: Department of Economics, University of Goettingen, http://www.vwl.wiso.uni-goettingen.de/lehrstuehle_aktuelles.php?ID=11
Jens Südekum: Universität Konstanz
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jens Suedekum

No 111, Departmental Discussion Papers from University of Goettingen, Department of Economics

Abstract: An increase in legally binding severance payments creates both an incentive and a disincentive for workers to invest in firmspecific human capital. Which effect prevails on balance depends on the productivity of the worker’s human capital investment. For strong positive reactions, increases in severance payments can even be mutually beneficial for workers and firms.

Keywords: Severance Payments; Employment Protection; Human Capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14
Date: 2001-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Severance Payments and Firm–specific Human Capital (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:got:vwldps:111

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