On Turkish elections and the political economy of state-orchestrated violence

Mehmet Ugur ()

No 14096, Greenwich Papers in Political Economy from University of Greenwich, Greenwich Political Economy Research Centre

Abstract: The results of the snap elections in Turkey have taken everybody by surprise. This is not because observers with a critical eye have failed to read the script correctly. Rather, it is because of the extent to which state-sponsored terror has proved effective in cajoling the electorate in Turkey to give their oppressors a mandate to rule in return for a ‘breathing space’. At the end, the ‘us or hell’ threat has worked because the ‘surprised’ observers have failed to react in time to the ruthless elimination of institutional checks and balances by the ruling AKP and its president.

Keywords: Turkey; governance; elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-06-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gpe:wpaper:14096

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