Coping with Autocracy: Corporate political activity, institutional duality, and MNE – local firm rivalry during “institutional backsliding”
Dorottya Sallai and
No 17628, Greenwich Papers in Political Economy from University of Greenwich, Greenwich Political Economy Research Centre
This study contributes to the corporate political activities (CPA) and the “institutional duality” literature by investigating how MNE subsidiaries and local firms develop their CPA in an increasingly politicised environment in an emerging market (EMs). Our longitudinal case study, based on interviews with top-level managers in Hungary, supports the view that institutional duality is not just a constraint for MNEs, but allows even firms from institutionally distant economies to successfully transfer political capabilities to the host context, providing them with competitive advantage over local firms. However, we also find that the value of these capabilities changes as institutional change progresses in our post-socialist case. Therefore institutional duality needs to be understood as a time-dependent phenomenon.
Keywords: Emerging markets; Nonmarket strategies; MNE subsidiaries; Competitive dynamics; Capabilities; Corporate political activities (CPA); Institution-based view; Transition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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