 Regulatory quality and performance in EU network industries: Evidence on telecommunications, gas and electricityMehmet Ugur () No 3255, Greenwich Papers in Political Economy from University of Greenwich, Greenwich Political Economy Research Centre Abstract: This article provides empirical evidence on ex ante and ex post indicators of regulatory quality and the relationship between those indicators and market performance in liberalised EU-15 network industries. It finds a low level of regulatory independence and competence, a high level of cross-country variations in regulatory quality, and widespread absence of correlation between ex ante regulatory quality and ex post performance indicators. On the basis of these findings, it suggests that the design of national regulatory agencies (NRAs) in Europe is not optimal and may be conducive to regulatory ineffectiveness or outright regulatory failure. Nevertheless, the existence and strengthening of EU-level regulators could enable EU member states to reduce the risk of regulatory failure by encouraging coordination and adoption of best practice. Keywords: economics of regulation; European public policy; regulatory quality; network industries (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Journal of Public Policy 3.29(2009): pp. 347-370 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gpe:wpaper:3255 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Greenwich Papers in Political Economy from University of Greenwich, Greenwich Political Economy Research Centre Contact information at EDIRC. |
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