Does economic governance matter?: Governance institutions and outcomes

Mehmet Ugur () and David Sunderland

No 4759, Greenwich Papers in Political Economy from University of Greenwich, Greenwich Political Economy Research Centre

Abstract: [Publisher's description] Economic governance institutions (rules, norms and enforcement practices) define the cost and incentive structures that influence the decisions of economic actors. They therefore have a significant impact on micro and macro economic performance across countries and time. This book contributes to the growing governance literature in three ways. Firstly, it extends the analysis to new areas such as power asymmetry, regulation, transnational company strategies, and law enforcement. Secondly, it examines the role of three types of institutions: formal institutions that shape and enforce the rules/norms codified in law; private-ordering institutions that function under the umbrella of the State; and private institutions (such as market rules/norms) that provide information and encourage compliance. Finally, the book extends and widens the governance debate, investigating topics such as the determinants of institutional quality and efficiency, and the dynamic interaction between institutional norms and networks.

Keywords: corporate governance; governance; networks; economics; power asymmetry; investment; economic governance and foreign aid; economic governance and regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gpe:wpaper:4759

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