Promoting Helping Behavior with Framing in Dictator games
No 06/04, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.
A number of recent papers on double-blind dictator games have obtained significant generous behavior when information regarding the recipient or any other social context is provided. In contrast, the lack of information discourages other-regarding behavior and the subject’s behavior closely approximates the game-theoretic prediction based on the selfishness assumption. This paper uses framing to explore the role of helping—behavior in dictator games. The whole experiment includes both classroom and regular experiments for the baseline and the framing treatment. To promote these motivations we included a “non—neutral” sentence at the end of the instructions, which reads “Note that he relies on you”. Our baseline and framed DG are statistically different from each other, indicating that the additional sentence promotes generous-regarding behavior.
Keywords: dictator game; framing effects; helping behavior; altruism. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D64 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-ltv and nep-soc
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Journal Article: Promoting helping behavior with framing in dictator games (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:06/04
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