Why gender based game theory?

Pablo Brañas-Garza

No 06/08, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.

Abstract: The behavior of men and women in a number of games free of social issues is explored. The analysis is conducted for simple (2x2) and complex (guessing) games and in static and repeated settings. No gender effect is observed either in static nor in repeated games. It is concluded that gender bias vanishes in the absence of social issues.

Keywords: Gender bias; dominated strategies; Nash equilibrium; learning.; Gender bias; dominated strategies; Nash equilibrium; learning. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2006-10-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ltv
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ugr.es/~teoriahe/RePEc/gra/wpaper/thepapers06_08.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:06/08

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. Campus Universitario de Cartuja. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Angel Solano Garcia. ().