Gender based prescriptions: evidence for altruism

Fernando Aguiar, Pablo Brañas-Garza, Ramon Cobo-Reyes, Natalia Jiménez () and Luis Miller
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Fernando Aguiar: IESA/CSIC

No 06/11, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.

Abstract: This paper analyzes the way in which men and women are expected to behave differently in an experimental situation. To do so, we concentrate on a single topic: altruism. Since the dictator game provides the most suitable design for studying altruism and generosity in the lab setting, we use a modified version to study the beliefs involved in the game. Our results are substantial: men and women are expected to behave differently and both believe that women are more generous. These two premises affect their behavior.

Keywords: prescriptions; dictator game; beliefs; generosity; gender (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2006-12-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-ltv and nep-soc
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http://www.ugr.es/~teoriahe/RePEc/gra/wpaper/thepapers06_11.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Are women expected to be more generous? (2009)
Working Paper: Are women expected to be more generous? (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:06/11

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