Versioning Goods and Joint Purchase: Substitution and Complementarity Strategies

Francisco Martínez-Sánchez

No 07/06, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.

Abstract: We analyze the monopolist’s decision about how to design different versions of a good, i.e. whether to make them substitutes or complements, when consumers can buy them simultaneously. In this context, we find that versioning goods as substitutes or complements may be optimal for the monopolist, and the final result depends on the degree of concavity and convexity of the cost function.

Keywords: Versioning Goods; Joint Purchase Option; Substitutes; Complementarity; Price Discrimination; Market Segmentation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L10 L12 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2007-12-31
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ugr.es/~teoriahe/RePEc/gra/wpaper/thepapers07_06.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Versioning Goods and Joint Purchase: Substitution and Complementarity Strategies (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:07/06

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. Campus Universitario de Cartuja. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Angel Solano Garcia. ().