Unraveling Public Good Games
Pablo Brañas-Garza and
Maria Paz Espinosa ()
No 08/01, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.
This paper provides experimental evidence on how players predict end game effects in a linear public good game. Our regression analysis yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on subjects’ beliefs and let us conclude that, first, the weight of the signal is relatively unimportant, while priors have a large weight and, second, priors are the same for all periods. Hence, subjects do not expect end game effects and they do very little updating of beliefs.
Keywords: public good game; end game effect; beliefs. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 C72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul and nep-mkt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Unraveling Public Good Games (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:08/01
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. Campus Universitario de Cartuja. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Angel Solano Garcia. ().