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From Plurality Rule to Proportional Representation

Selim Ergun ()

No 08/07, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.

Abstract: I consider the decision of a parliament that might change the electoral system for the forthcoming elections from plurality rule to proportional representation. Parties are o¢ ce-motivated. They care about winning and about the share of seats obtained. I consider two di¤erent scenarios of how parties in the government share the spoils of o¢ ce: Equally or proportionally to their share of seats. If the government is formed by a single party and parties expect that each party will obtain the same share of votes in the next election the electoral rule will never be changed. That is, for a change to occur the government should be formed by a coalition. I ?nd that a change is more likely to occur when the number of parties is larger and also when the spoils of o¢ ce are shared equally among the members in the governing coalition. I extend these results to analyze the decision of a change from a less proportional rule to a more proportional one.

Keywords: Electoral systems; Plurality; Proportional Representation; Coalitions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2008-10-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

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Journal Article: From plurality rule to proportional representation (2010) Downloads
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