Instinctive Response in the Ultimatum Game

Pablo Brañas-Garza, Debrah Meloso () and Luis Miller
Additional contact information
Debrah Meloso: Dpt. of Decision Sciences and Dondena Center, Bocconi University

No 08/08, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.

Abstract: In a series of recent papers, Ariel Rubinstein claims that the study of response time sheds light on the process of reasoning involved in classical economic decision problems. In particular, he considers that a distinction can be drawn between instinc- tive and cognitive reasoning. This paper complements and expands upon Rubinstein's study on time responses. We show that strategic risk is the key element in explaining differences in median response time in ultimatum behavior.

Keywords: Economic experiments; Ultimatum game; Yes-or-No game; median response time. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2008-11-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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http://www.ugr.es/~teoriahe/RePEc/gra/wpaper/thepapers08_08.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Interactive and Moral Reasoning: A Comparative Study of Response Times (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:08/08

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