Defined Contribution vs Defined Pension: Reforming the Legal Retirement Age

Juan A. Lacomba () and Francisco Lagos
Additional contact information
Juan A. Lacomba: Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.

No 08/13, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.

Abstract: In this paper we analyze the effects of changing Social Security parameters on the optimal legal retirement age. Two Social Security Systems are studied, with opposite results. When the pension scheme has a defined contribution, a more redistributive system will delay the preferred legal retirement age. On the other hand, when the pension benefit is the defined parameter, the increase in the redistribution level will lower this preferred age.

JEL-codes: H55 J26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2008-12-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ugr.es/~teoriahe/RePEc/gra/wpaper/thepapers08_13.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:08/13

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. Campus Universitario de Cartuja. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Angel Solano Garcia. ().