Applying Quadratic Scoring Rule transparently in multiple choice settings: A note
Filippos Exadaktylos (),
Hannes Koppel () and
Lauri Sääksvuori ()
No 10/01, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.
The quadratic scoring rule (QSR) is often used to guarantee an incentive compatible elicitation of subjective probabilities over events. Experimentalists have regularly not been able to ensure that subjects fully comprehend the consequences of their actions on payoffs given the rules of the games. In this note, we present a procedure that allows the transparent use of the QSR even in multiple-choice scenarios. For that purpose, two methodological means are applied: an alternative representation of the score and a short learning period to familiarize subjects with the payoff mechanism. The results suggest that both means were necessary and successful in facilitating subjects’ understanding of the rule.
Keywords: quadratic scoring rule; belief elicitation; saliency; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
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Working Paper: Applying Quadratic Scoring Rule transparently in multiple choice settings: A note (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:10/01
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