The Effect of Elections on Third-Party Punishment: An experimental Analysis
Ramón Cobo-Reyes (),
Natalia Jiménez () and
Ángel Solano García ()
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Ramón Cobo-Reyes: Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.
Ángel Solano García: Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Angel Solano-Garcia ()
No 12/01, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.
In this paper we analyze the behavior of an official who is elected democratically rather than being appointed exogenously. To this aim, we conduct an economic experiment in which officials are third party punishers in a public goods game. We consider two different scenarios which differ in the degree of cooperation within the society. We find that officials increase their punishment when they face elections in both scenarios. The increase in punishment is larger in the more cooperative scenario although differences are not statistically significant. Contrary to candidates’ expectations, voters always vote for the least severe candidate.
Keywords: Opportunism; Ideology; Punishment; Public Goods Games; Voting. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:12/01
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