Accepting Zero in the Ultimatum Game: Selfish Nash Response?

Gianandrea Staffiero (), Filippos Exadaktylos () and Antonio Espín
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Gianandrea Staffiero: Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business

No 13/01, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.

Abstract: The study shows that subjects who set their minimum acceptable offer equal to zero in an ultimatum game (UG) are the most generous dictators in a dictator game. The finding implies that interpreting indiscriminately the acceptance of low UG offers as payoff maximization can be misleading and suggests that altruism and/or the desire to maximize welfare are to a large extent behind.

Keywords: ultimatum game; dictator game; altruism; social welfare; costly punishment; selfishness; social preferences. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2013-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:13/01

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