A new solution for the roommate problem. The Q-stable matchings

Péter Biró, Elena Inarra and Elena Molis

No 14/04, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict preferences. We introduce the solution of maximum irreversibility and consider almost stable matchings (Abraham et al. [2]) and maximum stable matchings (Tan [30] [32]). We nd that almost stable matchings are incompatible with the other two solutions. Hence, to solve the roommate problem we propose matchings that lie at the intersection of the maximum irreversible matchings and maximum stable matchings, which are called Q-stable matchings. These matchings are core consistent and we o er an ecient algorithm for computing one of them. The outcome of the algorithm belongs to an absorbing set

Keywords: Cost allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2014-09-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ugr.es/~teoriahe/RePEc/gra/wpaper/thepapers14_04.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: A new solution for the roommate problem: The Q-stable matchings (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:14/04

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. Campus Universitario de Cartuja. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Angel Solano Garcia. ().