Random Lottery Incentive Mechanism in Dynamic Choice Experiments
Maria J. Ruiz Martos ()
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Maria J. Ruiz Martos: Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.
No 17/02, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.
Cubitt, Starmer and Sugden [TheEconomic Journal, 108, 1362-80, (1998)] pose a dynamic choice argument against the random lottery incentive (RLIS) mechanism. To wit, the RLIS relies on principles of dynamic choice. Thus, experimental research on the dynamic choice principles should be conducted ina single choice design. This study attempts to evaluate the empirical validity of their argument by quasi-replicating their single choice experiment in a RLIS design. Results suggest that one may use the RLISin dynamic choice experiments.
Keywords: experiments; payment approaches; non-expected utility and risk; dynamic choice principles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B49 C91 D11 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-exp and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:17/02
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