Spread of Information, Inequality and Cooperation
Elena Molis () and
Levent Neyse ()
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Elena Molis: Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.
No 20/01, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.
With the rise of information technologies, citizens can compare public good efficiencies between countries easier now and being aware of large efficiency differences may affect tax compliance behavior. We experimentally test whether contributions in the public goods game are sensitive to comparative information regarding marginal per capita returns of other groups. Our experimental results indeed suggest that comparative information creates polarization in contribution levels in the presence of large inequality between comparison groups.
Keywords: Public Goods; Inequality; Cooperation; Information; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 H4 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-ict
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:20/01
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