Compensation and sacrifice in the probabilistic rationing of indivisible units

Ricardo Martinez () and Juan D Moreno Ternero
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Juan D Moreno Ternero: Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide.
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

No 20/03, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.

Abstract: We consider the problem of randomly allocating indivisible units of a resource among agents with conflicting claims on the available amount. In the two-agent case, we characterize three focal rules combining axioms reflecting principles of compensation and sacrifice: probabilistic uniform awards, probabilistic uniform losses and probabilistic concede-and-divide. In the general case of n agents, the two uniform rules are characterized adding the axiom of consistency. There is, however, no consistent extension of probabilistic concede-and-divide.

Keywords: rationing; resource allocation; axioms; probabilistic; discrete goods. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2020-04-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gen and nep-ore
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http://www.ugr.es/~teoriahe/RePEc/gra/wpaper/thepapers20_03.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Compensation and sacrifice in the probabilistic rationing of indivisible units (2022)
Working Paper: Compensation and sacrifice in the probabilistic rationing of indivisible units (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:20/03

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