Standard vs random dictator games. The effect of role uncertainty on generosity
Ismael Rodriguez-Lara and
Additional contact information
Ernesto Mesa-Vázquez: University of Valencia & ERICES.
No 20/05, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.
Using a multiple-price list dictator game, this paper provides experimental evidence that the level of generosity is affected when we vary the probability that the dictator’s decision will be implemented. We also show that framing matters for generosity in that subjects are less generous when their choices under role uncertainty are such that subjects perceive that they are in the role of dictators and know that their choices will be implemented with a certain probability, compared with a setting in which subjects are told that they are in the role of recipients and know that their choices will not be implemented with certain probability.
Keywords: dictator games; generosity; role uncertainty; framing effects. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D3 D6 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:20/05
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. Campus Universitario de Cartuja. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Angel Solano Garcia. ().