Experimental Bank Runs
Hubert Janos Kiss,
Ismael Rodriguez-Lara and
Alfonso Rosa-García ()
No 21/03, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.
This chapter on experimental bank runs first covers the different sources of bank runs studied in the laboratory; fundamental problems, coordination issues, and panic behavior. We assess which individual characteristics (especially risk and loss aversion, gender and cognitive abilities) shape the willingness to withdraw. We also discuss depositors’ behavior when there is more than one bank. The different policies suggested in the literature to prevent bank runs are reviewed as well. Finally, we point out relevant issues that have not been studied yet and deserve further investigation.
Keywords: bank run; experiment; observability; panic; withdrawal decision. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:21/03
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. Campus Universitario de Cartuja. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Angel Solano Garcia. ().