Social solidarity with dummies in the museum pass problem
Ricardo Martínez () and
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Ricardo Martínez: Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.
No 21/11, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.
We study the problem of sharing the revenue obtained by selling museum passes from the axiomatic perspective. In this setting, we propose replacing the usual dummy axiom with a milder requirement; social solidarity with dummies. This new axiom formalizes the philosophical idea that even null agents/museums may have the right to receive a minimum allocation in a sharing situation. By replacing dummy with social solidarity with dummies, we characterize several families of rules, which are convex combinations of the uniform and Shapley approaches. Our findings generalize several existing results in the literature. Also, we consider a domain of problems that is richer than the domain proposed by Ginsburgh and Zang (2003) in their seminal paper on the museum pass problem.
Keywords: museum passes; social solidarity; dummy; Shapley rule; uniform rule. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:21/11
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