Economics at your fingertips  

Revisiting Methodological Individualism in Game Theory: The Contributions of Schelling and Bacharach

Lauren Larrouy

No 2015-14, GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France

Abstract: The purpose of this contribution is to illustrate how both Schelling and Bacharach’s methodologies can help scholars bring a new approach to behavioral game theory in which the nature of usual standard methodological individualism is insufficiently questioned. I aim to show that both Schelling and Bacharach question the nature of interactive rationality. They provide original insight concerning (i) the conditions of possibility of the existence of determinate solutions and (ii) the resolution process of games. Furthermore, their questioning of the methodological implications of the well-known trio of standard game theory (common knowledge, the transparency of reasons and the reduction of "strategic uncertainty" to "physical uncertainty") offers some ideas on how to build an alternative theory of games. As forerunners, they open an ongoing research program which can still be a fruitful source of methodological innovation regarding interactive rationality and its collective determinants.

Keywords: game theory; interactive rationality; framing; focal point; team reasoning; methodological individualism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B21 B41 C72 D03 D79 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2015-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-gth, nep-his and nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) First version, 2015 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to (A connection attempt failed because the connected party did not properly respond after a period of time, or established connection failed because connected host has failed to respond.)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Patrice Bougette ().

Page updated 2023-02-02
Handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2015-14