Bayesian Game Theorists and Non-Bayesian Players
Guilhem Lecouteux ()
No 2017-30, GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis
Bayesian game theorists claim to represent players as Bayes rational agents, maximising their expected utility given their beliefs about the choices of other players. I argue that this narrative is inconsistent with the formal structure of Bayesian game theory. This is because (i) the assumption of common belief in rationality is equivalent to equilibrium play, as in classical game theory, and (ii) the players' prior beliefs are a mere mathematical artefact and not actual beliefs held by the players. Bayesian game theory is thus a Bayesian representation of the choice of players who are committed to play equilibrium strategy profiles.
Keywords: Bayesianism; common belief in rationality; epistemic game theory; interactive epistemology; prior beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B21 C72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-upt
Date: 2017-11, Revised 2018-07
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http://www.gredeg.cnrs.fr/working-papers/GREDEG-WP-2017-30.pdf Revised version, 2018-07 (application/pdf)
Working Paper: Bayesian Game Theorists and non-Bayesian Players (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gre:wpaper:2017-30
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