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Compromise for the Per Capita Complaint: An Optimization Characterization of Two Equalitarian Values

Dongshuang Hou, Aymeric Lardon, Panfei Sun and Theo Driessen
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Dongshuang Hou: Department of Applied Mathematics, Northwestern Polytechnical University
Panfei Sun: Department of Applied Mathematics, Northwestern Polytechnical University
Theo Driessen: Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Twente, The Netherlands

No 2018-13, GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis

Abstract: The main purpose of this article is to introduce two new values for transferable utility (TU) games: the upper and lower optimal complaint values. These are based on two kinds of per capita complaint criteria and each involve a lower and upper bound of the core. In the spirit of the nucleolus, these two values are obtained by lexicographically minimizing a maximal complaint vector associated with each of the per capita complaint criterion. Interestingly, the upper and lower optimal complaint values respectively coincide with the Equal Allocation of Non-Separable Contributions and the Center-of-Gravity of Imputation Set Value for a large class of TU-games. Moreover, a characterization of these two values is achieved by invoking the equal upper and lower maximal per capita complaint properties together with efficiency.

Keywords: Cooperative game; optimal complaint values; equalitarian values; equal maximal per capita complaint properties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
Date: 2018-06
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gre:wpaper:2018-13

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