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Axiomatic Foundations of a Unifying Concept of the Core of Games in Effectiveness Form

Stéphane Gonzalez () and Aymeric Lardon

No 2018-15, GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis

Abstract: We provide an axiomatic characterization of the core of games in effectiveness form. We point out that the core, whenever it applies to appropriate classes of these games, coincides with a wide variety of prominent stability concepts in social choice and game theory, such as the Condorcet winner, the Nash equilibrium, the pairwise stability, and the stable matchings, among others. Our characterization of the core invokes the axioms of non-emptiness, coalitional unanimity, and Maskin monotonicity together with a principle of independence of irrelevant states, and uses in its proof a holdover property echoing the conventional ancestor property. Taking special cases of this general characterization of the core, we derive new characterizations of the previously mentioned stability concepts.

Keywords: Effectiveness function; core; axiomatization; holdover property; consistency principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-gth
Date: 2018-06
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Related works:
Working Paper: Axiomatic foundations of a unifying concept of the core of games in effectiveness form (2018)
Working Paper: Axiomatic foundations of a unifying concept of the core of games in effectiveness form (2018)
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