Uncertainty and Information Sources' Reliability

Gerard Mondello

No 2021-31, GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France

Abstract: This paper studies the impact of the reliability of information sources on choices under ambiguity. Using the Ellsberg's (1961) framework it studies two conjectures. First, the conditions of appearance of the Ellsberg paradox when the information source offers two probable proportions of red and black balls in two urns. Second, the consequence on choices of a non-reliable information source. This source proposes a unique proportion of red and black balls against an unknown one (inside box 1). Thus, either the proportion is correct, or it is unknown (ambiguous). We show that despite le information source unreliability, the decision-maker will trust the given information.

Keywords: Uncertainty theory; decision theory; ambiguity aversion; Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 D81 D83 I10 I18 I19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2021-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic, nep-ore and nep-upt
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http://195.220.190.85/GREDEG-WP-2021-31.pdf First version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION SOURCES' RELIABILITY (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gre:wpaper:2021-31

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