Information Source's Reliability

Gerard Mondello

No 2022-21, GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France

Abstract: This paper studies the impact of unreliable information sources on the decision process under ambiguity. Using a modified Ellsberg framework, it compares two types of agents: one is a Savage expected utility maximizer and the other a Neo-Choquet-type expected utility maximizer. This comparison shows that while the former will always conform to the source of information regardless of its level of reliability, the latter will make its choice based on its levels of preference/aversion for ambiguity and its degree of optimism/pessimism. Therefore, this explains why decision-makers may choose randomly when the reliability of the information source is too low.

Keywords: Uncertainty theory; decision theory; ambiguity aversion; Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 D81 D83 I1 I18 I19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2022-06, Revised 2022-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-upt
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http://195.220.190.85/GREDEG-WP-2022-21.pdf Revised version, 2022-10 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Information Source's Reliability (2023)
Working Paper: Information source’s reliability (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gre:wpaper:2022-21

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