Takeover bid and game theory: an empirical investigation on the French market

Véronique Bessière

No 1997-1, Accepted Papers Series from Montpellier University, Center for Research in Finance

Abstract: The bid premium acquiring companies offer for target company shares has been modelled as a game by several theoritical studies, but the empirical implications of these models have not been as well explored. Our purpose is to test them on the French market for 1991-1995. The mean takeover premium of our sample is 31.3%. Our empirical results suggest that principal determinants of bid premium are the expected synergies, the percentage of the target shares controlled by the bidder prior to the offer, and the dilution of minority shares. We show a non linear relation between the bid premium and the part of voting rights previously controlled. In opposition to previous studies, the mean of payment has a non significant impact on the bid price.

Pages: 11 pages
Date: 1997-01-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Banque et Marches, No. 31, November-December 1997

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.revue-banque.fr/affichageArticle.do?sho ... older=banque_marches (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.revue-banque.fr/affichageArticle.do?shortcut=article_2437_1&shortcutCurrentRevue=N311&shortcutParentFolder=banque_marches [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.revue-banque.fr/affichageArticle.do)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:grf:mtpaps:vb004

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Accepted Papers Series from Montpellier University, Center for Research in Finance Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael Kaestner ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).