Delegation in a group-contest

Lambert Schoonbeek

No 200201, CCSO Working Papers from University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research

Abstract: It is known that the option of delegation in a rent-seeking contest between two individuals leads to a prisoner's dilemma. In equilibrium no player hires a delegate, while it is Pareto-efficient if both would hire one. This paper shows that this result does not generalize to a contest between the members of two groups. We further provide the conditions under which zero, one, or both groups hire a delegate in equilibrium.

Date: 2002
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Related works:
Journal Article: Delegation in a group-contest (2004)
Working Paper: Delegation in a group-contest (2002)
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