Having more potential raiders weakens the takeover threat

Linda A. Toolsema
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Linda A. Toolsema: Groningen University

No 03F16, Research Report from University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management)

Abstract: We argue in this paper that a more active market for corporate control may weaken the takeover threat. We show that an increase in the number of potential raiders tends to decrease the probability of a takeover. This in turn weakens managerial incentives. The lower managerial effort level that results in equilibrium negatively aspects the ex ante value of the firm.

Date: 2003
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