On the Existence of Anonymous and Balanced Mechanisms Implementing the Lindahl Allocations

Sébastien Rouillon

Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) from Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA)

Abstract: In this note, we discuss the existence of anonymous and balanced mechanisms to implement the Lindahl allocations. We obtain an impossibility result for the class of mechanisms defining an homeomorphism between the message space and the allocation space.

Keywords: Lindahl equilibrium; economic mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:grt:wpegrt:2008-18

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