A new mechanism to implement the Lindahl equilibriums (In French)

Sébastien Rouillon

Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) from Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA)

Abstract: This paper presents a new economic mechanism, such that the associated game form implements Lindahl equilibria as Nash equilibria. Each player sends a 2-dimensional message, in order to tell his marginal propensity to pay and his demand for the public good. At a Nash equilibrium, the players directly and honestly reveal data defining a Lindahl equilibrium and the mechanism implements the corresponding allocation. In a quasi-linear economy, formalizing out-of-equilibrium behaviours of the players as a gradient process, the unique stationary point of this process is a Nash equilibrium of the game and it is shown to be globally stable.

Keywords: Public good; Lindalh equilibrium; Economic mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-pbe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:grt:wpegrt:2009-09

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