Optimal decentralized management of a natural resource

Sébastien Rouillon

Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) from Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA)

Abstract: We construct an economic mechanism to realize in Nash equilibrium an optimal consumption time path of a natural resource. For exposition convenience, the analysis is conducted within the model initiated by Levhari and Mirman (1980). This framework allows us to explicitly calculate the consumption time paths of the resource, associated with an open-access regime, with a cooperative management and with a (stationary Markovian) Nash equilibrium of the di¤erence game induced by the proposed mechanism.

Keywords: Natural resource; Fish war; Difference game; Mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Decentralized Management of a natural resource (2010)
Working Paper: Optimal decentralized management of a natural resource (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:grt:wpegrt:2010-15

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