An Economic Mechanism to Regulate Multispecies Fisheries

Sébastien Rouillon

Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) from Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA)

Abstract: We study the management of a multispecies fishery, exploited under a non-selective harvesting technology. We construct an economic mechanism to regulate the fishery. Under a large class of models, capable of accounting for imperfect competition, congestion externalities, pro-social motivations and/or resource amenities, we show that any (stationary Markovian) Nash equilibrium of the differential game induced by our economic mechanism implements an optimal utilization of the resource. Using a specification of the general model, which adapts Clemhout and Wan (1985) and can be solved explicitly, we exhibit a (stationary Markovian) Nash equilibrium of the differential game, proving existence of (stationary Markovian) Nash equilibria within this environment.

Keywords: Natural resource; Fish war; Multispecies; Differential game; Mechanism design. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-env and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: An economic mechanism to regulate multispecies fisheries (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:grt:wpegrt:2012-23

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