Discriminatory club and moral ability to co-operate

Sébastien Barillot and Jerome Ballet

Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) from Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA)

Abstract: The article asserts that the efficiency of a collective action depends on two factors. First, the variation of the congestion cost according to the size and the membership structure defines equilibrium access conditions. Second, individual calculus and optimum perception are influenced by the individual’s ability to regard others as partners. So, we use a model of discriminatory club with “moral ability\" to co-operate. Finally, some unusual club’s shapes are described.

Keywords: discriminatory club; toll; co-operation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:grt:wpegrt:2015-04

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