Agricultural insurance index-based: justification and implementation in Niger

Ahamadou Maichanou

Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) from Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA)

Abstract: This article focuses on borrowers default in rural credit in Niger, according to their food needs situation. Given that economic agents are likely to adopt opportunistic behavior rather than mutually beneficial relations when facing natural hazards, this analysis is taken from the perspective of contract theory with asymmetric information. In the case of rural Niger, it empirically addresses the determinants of involuntary default, voluntary default and repayment effort, while managing the difficulties of applying the concepts of information economy and uncertainty to the complexity of rural area credit in a developing country. Results show more involuntary default than voluntary one and a real willing to repay. These results make us to provide support for households with effort repayment willing and establish an incentives structure for all kind of borrowers.

Keywords: Contract; credit; risk of default; asymmetry of information; rural; Niger (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-mfd and nep-pay
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:grt:wpegrt:2016-05

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