Independence and accountability within the monetary policy committee of the BCEAO
Régis Bokino and
Cahiers du GREThA from Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA)
The organization of the monetary decision-making in central banks has changed internationally and for the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). The decisions are now taken by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). The arguments on the expected benefits of this procedure are provided by the economic literature and are linked to the recent wave of central bank independence. If the MPC is independent, it has an obligation to be accountable. However, independence and accountability are not identical in term of the MPC. This article examines the MPC of BCEAO established in 2010, which is independent in accordance with the recommendations of the credibility strategy of the new classical economics and collective accountability.
Keywords: CPM; central bank independence; accountability; BCEAO monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 E58 O55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:grt:wpegrt:2018-24
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