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The evolution of taking roles

Florian Herold () and Christoph Kuzmics
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Florian Herold: University of Bamberg, Germany

No 2017-09, Graz Economics Papers from University of Graz, Department of Economics

Abstract: Individuals are randomly matched to play an ex-ante symmetric hawk-dove game. Individuals assume one of a finite set of observable labels and condition their action choice on their opponent's label. We study the evolutionary stability of chosen labels and their social interaction structure. Evolutionary stable social structures are different for games in which a dove player prefers the opponent to play hawk (anti-coordination games), and those in which everyone prefers their opponent to play dove (confl ict games). Non-trivial hierarchical social structures can only emerge in anti-coordination games. Egalitarian social structures can emerge in both, but are more fragile in con flict games.

Keywords: Evolution; Hawk-Dove Games; Roles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-hpe
Date: 2017-09
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Working Paper: The evolution of taking roles (2016) Downloads
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