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The distribution of article quality and inefficiencies in the market for scientific journals

Philipp Kohlgruber () and Christoph Kuzmics
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Philipp Kohlgruber: University of Graz, Austria

No 2017-11, Graz Economics Papers from University of Graz, Department of Economics

Abstract: We build an oligopoly model of the market of scientific journals that allows us to relate the (in-)efficiency of this market to the exogenous distribution of article quality. Journal quality is endogenously determined by the submission choices of scientists. The efficiency of any stable equilibrium depends crucially on the exogenous distribution of article quality, especially on the fatness of the upper tail. For the empirically plausible Pareto distribution the market is inefficient even in the limit as the number of publishers tends to infinity.

Keywords: Oligopoly; Natural monopoly; Efficiency; Price competition; Endogenous product differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D43 L13 L15 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-mic and nep-sog
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc

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