International Environmental Agreements and the Paradox of Cooperation: Revisiting and Generalizing Some Previous Results

Michael Finus (), Francesco Furini () and Anna Viktoria Rohrer ()
Additional contact information
Francesco Furini: University of Hamburg, Germany and Universit Ca Foscari Venezia, Italy
Anna Viktoria Rohrer: University of Graz, Austria

Graz Economics Papers from University of Graz, Department of Economics

Abstract: In his seminal paper Barrett (1994) argued that international environmental agreements (IEAs) are typical not successful, which he coined the paradox of cooperation . Either self-enforcing IEAs are small and, hence, cannot achieve much or, if they are large, then the gains from cooperation are small. This message has been reiterated by several subsequent papers by and large. However, the determination of stable agreements and their evaluation have been predominantly derived for specific payoff functions and many conclusions are based on simulations. In this paper, we provide analytically solutions for the size of stable agreements, the paradox of cooperation and the underlying forces. Many of our results are a generalization of papers by Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006), Rubio and Ulph (2006) and the recent paper by McGinty (2020).

Keywords: International environmental agreements; Stability; Paradox of cooperation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D62 H41 Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://unipub.uni-graz.at/obvugrveroeff/download/ ... riginalFilename=true

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:grz:wpaper:2021-05

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://repecgrz.uni-graz.at/RePEc/

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Graz Economics Papers from University of Graz, Department of Economics University of Graz, Universitaetsstr. 15/F4, 8010 Graz, Austria. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Stefan Borsky ().