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Global Climate Governance in the Light of Geoengineering: A Shot in the Dark?

Michael Finus (michael.finus@uni-graz.at) and Francesco Furini (francesco.furini@uni-hamburg.de)
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Francesco Furini: University of Hamburg, Germany

No 2022-02, Graz Economics Papers from University of Graz, Department of Economics

Abstract: Solar radiation management (SRM), as one form of geoengineering, has been proposed as a last exit strategy to address global warming. Even though SRM is expected to be cheap, it may be risky and associated with high collateral damages. We analyze how SRM affects equilibrium mitigation strategies, the governance architecture of a climate agreement and whether and how signatories to a climate agreement can avoid that non-signatories deploy SRM. We show under which conditions the threat to deploy geoengineering can stabilize a large climate agreement. Results are derived in a cartel formation game and all qualitative conclusions are confirmed in a repeated game framework.

Keywords: mitigation-geoengineering game; solar radiation management; collateral damages; climate agreements. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D74 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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