Equitable Voting with Many Alternatives

Steven Kivinen

No 2025-03, Graz Economics Papers from University of Graz, Department of Economics

Abstract: Voting procedures in many democracies satisfy a weak version of fairness called equity (Bartholdi et al., 2021) while violating the standard fairness criterion of anonymity. We study equitable voting procedures when there are more than two alternatives that can be ordered on a left-right political spectrum. While the median of the median voter rule is not a generalized median voter (GMV) rule, we show that it is non-manipulable and equitable. There exist non-manipulable, equitable voting rules with winning coalitions comprising a vanishing fraction of the population. In addition, with the help of some recent group theoretic results, we give conditions under which equity can be used to characterize the class of GMV rules.

Keywords: Voting; Equity; Strategy-proofness; Median of the Medians (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-03
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