Strategic Communication with Partial Expertise

Elshan Garashli ()
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Elshan Garashli: University of Graz, Austria

No 2026-23, Graz Economics Papers from University of Graz, Department of Economics

Abstract: Decision makers rely on experts who observe part of the information relevant to a choice. We study communication when an expert observes one component of a decision target but her observation also predicts a missing component. This indirect information can sustain communication despite conflicts of interest. The largest conflict consistent with informative communication depends on what extreme observations imply about the missing component, not on correlation alone. When this prediction is linear, higher correlation permits finer communication and raises the value of listening relative to no information. Yet this need not improve welfare because the decision itself becomes more difficult.

Keywords: strategic communication; partial expertise; correlated information; price benchmarks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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