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Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: Empirical Evidence of the Distress and Non-Distress Companies

Nico Alexander ()
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Nico Alexander: Trisakti School of Management, Jakarta, Indonesia Author-2-Name: Theresia Author-2-Workplace-Name: Trisakti School of Management, Jakarta, Indonesia Author-3-Name: Dewi Kurnia Indrastuti Author-3-Workplace-Name: Trisakti School of Management, Jakarta, Indonesia Author-4-Name: Author-4-Workplace-Name: Author-5-Name: Author-5-Workplace-Name: Author-6-Name: Author-6-Workplace-Name: Author-7-Name: Author-7-Workplace-Name: Author-8-Name: Author-8-Workplace-Name:

GATR Journals from Global Academy of Training and Research (GATR) Enterprise

Abstract: Objective - The purpose of this research is to obtain empirical research on the effect of corporate governance on earnings management in distressed and non-distressed companies. Corporate governance in this research is measured by independent board, audit committee, board of commissioners, institutional ownership and number of board commissioner meetings. The research predicts that corporate governance has a negative effect on earnings management either both in distressed and non-distressed companies. Methodology/Technique - This research uses 309 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange and the data was obtained using purposive sampling method during 2016 until 2018. Of the 309 respondents in the sample, 287 are distressed companies and 22 are non-distressed companies. The data was analyzed using a multiple regression method. Findings - The empirical results show that commissioner board and institutional ownership have a negative effect on earnings management in non-distressed companies but in distressed companies, corporate governance does not have an effect on earnings management. This research shows that distressed companies, corporate governance cannot minimize earnings management practices because to maintain the company as a going concern, management will do earnings management to ensure stakeholders' trust to encourage further investment in the company. In non-distressed companies, corporate governance can minimize earnings management practices because the company is in a good financial condition, so they don't need to do earnings management. Additionally, in order to ensure stakeholders' trust, the company will strengthen its' corporate governance mechanisms. Type of Paper - Empirical.

Keywords: Financial Distress; Earnings Management; Non-Financial Distress; Indonesia Stock Exchange. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 J33 K22 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8
Date: 2021-03-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-cfn and nep-sea
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Published in Accounting and Finance Review, Volume 5, Issue 4

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gtr:gatrjs:afr195

DOI: 10.35609/afr.2021.5.4(3)

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