Agreement toward stability in senior matching markets
David Cantala ()
No EC200201, Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers from Universidad de Guanajuato, Department of Economics and Finance
Abstract:
A stable matching disrupted by the retirement of workers or the opening, by firms, of positions is said to be firm quasi stable. We prove that, when firms have responsive preferences, the set of stable matchings unanimously preferred by workers to a firm quasi-stable matching has a lattice structure. The result does not necessarily hold when firms have q-substitutable preferences. In this case, we show that the set of stable matchings unanimously preferred by workers to a firm quasi-stable matching contains an element which is unanimously less preferred by workers and most preferred by firms, to any other element in the set: this is the outcome of he Set Offering Algorithm when we take as input the worker quasi-stable matching above mentioned.
Keywords: Senior; Mathing; Models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2002-02, Revised 2007-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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http://economia.ugto.org/WorkingPapers/EC200201.pdf Revised version, 2007 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gua:wpaper:ec200201
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