Economics at your fingertips  

Strategic Information Acquisition in Networked Groups with "Informational Spillovers"

Antonio Jimenez-Martinez

No EC200801, Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers from Universidad de Guanajuato, Department of Economics and Finance

Abstract: This paper develops a model of costly information acquisition by agents who are connected through a network. For a exogenously given network, each agent decides fi rst on information acquisition from his neighbors and then, after processing the information acquired, takes an action. Each agent is concerned about the extent to which other agents align their actions with the underlying state. A new equilibrium notion, which is in the spirit of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, is proposed to analyze information acquisition decisions within networked groups. This equilibrium notion allows each agent to compute, when deciding about information acquisition, the extent to which changes in his information acquisition decision will a ffect his own perception of future expected payo s. Agents anticipate and incorporate such changes in their information acquisition decisions. Both the efficient and the equilibrium information acquisition pro les are characterized and the compatibility between them is related to the density of the network.

Keywords: Incomplete Information; Information Acquisition; Communication Networks; Informational Spillovers; Coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2007-10, Revised 2008-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-ict, nep-net and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc

Downloads: (external link) Revised Version, 2008 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to (No such host is known. )

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers from Universidad de Guanajuato, Department of Economics and Finance Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Luis Sanchez Mier ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).

Page updated 2024-03-31
Handle: RePEc:gua:wpaper:ec200801